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ABSTRACT 
 
The Western Balkans integration within the EU has started a legal process which is the rejection of former 
communist legal/political approaches and the transformation of former communist institutions. Indeed, the EU 
agenda has brought vertical/horizontal integration and Europeanization of national institutions (i.e. shifting 
power to the EU institutions and international authorities). At this point, it is very crucial to emphasize the fact 
that the Western Balkans as a whole region has currently an image that includes characteristics of both the 
Soviet socialism and the European democracy. The EU foreign policies and enlargement strategy for Western 
Balkans have significant effects on four core factors (i.e. Schengen visa regulations, remittances, asylum and 
migration as an aggregate process). The convergence/divergence of EU member states’ priorities for migration 
policies  regulate  and  even  shape  directly  the  migration  dynamics  in  migrant  sender  countries.  From  this 
standpoint, the research explores how main migration factors are influenced by political and judicial factors 
such as; rule of law and democracy score, the economic liberation score, political and human rights, civil 
society score and citizenship rights in Western Balkan countries. The proposal of interhybridity explores how 
the hybridization of state and non-state actors within home and host countries can solve labor migration-related 
problems. The economical and sociopolitical labor-migration model of Basu (2009) is overlapping with the 
multidimensional empirical framework of interhybridity. Indisputably, hybrid model (i.e. collaboration state and 
non-state  actors)  has  a  catalyst  role  in  terms  of  balancing  social  problems  and  civil  society  needs. 
Paradigmatically, it is better to perceive the hybrid model as a combination of communicative and strategic 
action that means the reciprocal recognition within the model is precondition for significant functionality. This 
will shape social and industrial relations with moral meanings of communication. 
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the confinements and ravages of imperialism, has now shifted from the settled, established, and domesticated 
dynamics of culture to its unhoused, decentered, and exilic energies, energies whose incarnation today is the 
migrant,1 and whose consciousness is that of the intellectual and artist in exile, the political figure between domains, 
between forms, between homes, and between languages1ﾻ 
 
                 --- Edward W. Said – Culture and Imperialism, 1993: 332 --- 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The  EU  started  to  shape  a  common  migration  policy  with  Maastricht  Treaty  which  ensured  a  ground  to 
structure intergovernmental cooperation. Afterwards, the Amsterdam Treaty put it a step further and included 
migration policies at the Union level (Community Pillar Title IV) and the Schengen Agreement into acquis 
communitaire. In Title V, the Lisbon Treaty (TFEU) has transformed the intergovernmental cooperation to 
transgovernmental cooperation which covers the Union, member states and the third countries. Likewise, the 
TFEU has centralized the power at Union level for more effective migration policies and the centralization to 
Brussels has provided convergence and divergence in various migration issues.2 At national level, the EU 
respects  all  member  states’  own  constitutions  and  regulations  because  all  member  states  have  their 
sovereignty rights and some member states which suffer from high migration and asylum flows, are referring to 
their national law and regulations. Accordingly, the EU attaches considerable attention to the bilateral and 
multilateral relations/agreements (e.g. visa policy, cooperation with countries on illegal migration flows and 
back illegal migrant agreements). These relations and agreements are necessary and precondition for regional 
cooperation and enlargement policy. 
Thus the Western Balkans appears as a strategic region which has high priorities for regional cooperation 
and strategic partnership for the creation of the EU security cycle through becoming closer to these countries. 
Latterly, the EU has given many rights (i.e. visa liberalizations, social and cultural funds, financial aid and so 
forth) particularly to the Western Balkan countries. Approving Croatia as twenty-eighth EU member state, 
giving candidate status to Serbia, starting visa liberalization talks with Kosovo, helping Albania to achieve 
interparty agreement (government-opposition) and political stability and many other positive outcomes ought to 
be perceived as great successes of the EU efforts. 
From  the  perspective  of  free  movement  of  persons  and  workers  as  fundamental  rights  which  are 
guaranteed by the EU law, the Schengen regulations bring a paradox regarding migration and asylum issues. 
The judicial complaints, debates and skeptic attitudes in France, Italy, Germany and Spain against migration 
policies and Schengen regulations have illustrated this fact perfectly. In 2009, only these four countries have 
received approximately half of the total Schengen visas (4709491 visas, 49.02 per cent of total visas) in 
Schengen zone. With these facts in mind, for the Western Balkan countries visa liberalizations have provided 
overstay of migrants and asylum applications.  All Western Balkan countries’ (currently except Kosovo) citizens 
are allowed to enter any EU member state without a visa for maximum 90 days and 180 day in a year and they 
move  to  any  member  state  within  this  process.  Chronically,  some  matters  of  free  movement  lay  on  the 
circulation within the Schengen zone. To give an instance, immigrants who want to establish their lives with 
their families  in France, are not allowed to use Italy as transit country through applying for international 
protection right. Generally, the Schengen states are sending back immigrants to the previous country from 
where  they  have  entered  (i.e.  first  asylum  principle).  Essentially,  the  study  investigates  the  fundamental 
reasons through using empirical data and attempts to connect the main migration factors (e.g. visa, remittance, 
asylum and migration as an aggregate process) that are influenced by political and judicial factors such as; rule 
of law and democracy score, the economic liberation score, political and human rights, civil society score and 
citizenship rights in Western Balkans. In general, the research questions are as follows: 
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General Questions  Form of Questioning 
1. Have the EU integration process and enlargement agenda significant 
effect on transformation of Industrial Relations and  Post-Communist 
Institutions within Western Balkans? 
If yes Why? How?  
2. Have the characteristics of transformation process been shaped in 
between the Soviet Socialism and the European democracy? 
How? To what extend? 
3.  Is  the  role  of  Constitutional  Courts  in  Western  Balkan  states 
significant at enhancement of judicial independence and judicial review, 
level of democracy/democratization and rule of law? 
Why? To what extend?  
4. Can voice – entitlement nexus on the one hand, and legitimacy – 
effectiveness  on  the  other  be  clarified  in  the  context  of  industrial 
relations and democracy?3 
How?  At  which  level:  national, 
international and/or supranational? 
The  research  contributes  at  both  the  theoretical  and  empirical  levels  to  the  insights  of  employment 
relationship and comparative political analyses of Western Balkan countries. Specifically, it is important to ask; 
on the one hand how the Western Balkan countries ought to preserve characteristics of Soviet Socialism, and 
on the other, how these sovereign states will keep up doing reforms in political and judiciary area for meeting 
European standards and norms during the Europeanization and EU integration process without causing any 
damage toward the characteristics of Soviet Socialism. The research has focused on the Codebook of the 
Comparative Data Set (SPSS DATA 2006) for 28 Post-Communist Countries 1989 – 2006 (Klaus Armingeon, 
University of Berne), the Comparative Constitutional Project (University of Illinois) and the Judinst Project – 
Assessing Judicial Institutions and Judicial Performances in which I was an intern at Max Planck Institute for 
Comparative Public Law and International Law in Heidelberg. According to the scope of these codebooks, 
research hypotheses and empirical techniques have been generated as below.4 
 
1.  Elections 
H1  The date of election of national Parliament affects the percentage of votes. 
H2  The president’s term in office has significant effect on mode of electing the president. 
H3  The voter turnout in the parliamentary election influences percentage of votes. 
H4  The number of seats contested in each election affects the percentage of seats. 
H5 
The percentage of votes obtained by the winning candidate in presidential election influences  
the turnout for presidential election. 
2.  Post-Communist Institutions 
H6  The political system significantly influences the mode of election of upper chamber. 
H7  The index of rigidity of constitution affects electoral system for the (lower chamber of the) Parliament. 
H8  The presidential power index has an effect on popular veto and veto point referendum. 
3.  Women in Parliament 
H9  The number of women in Parliament affects the type of cabinet. 
4.  Party System 
H10  The effective number of parties in Parliament has an influence on the type of cabinet. 
5.  Complexion of Government 
H11  The complexion of government affects the percentage of seats. 
6.  Democracy 
H12 
The democratization score significantly influences the electoral process, civil society, independent  
media and governance scores. 
H13  Rule of Law score has an effect on judicial framework and independence, and corruption scores. 
H14  The democracy score affects the national and local democratic governance scores. 
 
 
 
 7.  Industrial Relations 
H15 
The number of workers involved in labor conflicts has an effect on the unemployment as  
a percentage of the labor force. 
H16  The constitution has a significant effect on industrial relations. 
[PROVWORK] - Does the constitution mention a state duty to provide work/employment?  
1. Yes; 2. No  
a. other, please specify in the comments section b. Unable to Determine  c. Not Applicable 
[REMUNER] - Does the constitution provide the right to just remuneration, fair or equal payment for work?  
1. Yes; 2. No  
a. other, please specify in the comments section b. Unable to Determine c. Not Applicable 
[JOINTRDE] - Does the constitution provide for the right to form or to join trade unions?  
1. Yes; 2. No  
a. other, please specify in the comments section b. Unable to Determine c. Not Applicable 
[STRIKE] - Does the constitution provide for a right to strike?  
1. Yes; 2. No  
a. other, please specify in the comments section b. Unable to Determine c. Not Applicable 
[LEISURE] - Does the constitution provide for a right of rest and leisure? 
1. Yes; 2. No  
a. other, please specify in the comments section b. Unable to Determine c. Not Applicable 
[SAFEWORK] - Does the constitution mention the right to safe/healthy working conditions?  
1. Yes; 2. No  
a. other, please specify in the comments section b. Unable to Determine c. Not Applicable 
8.  Judiciary 
H17 
Verdicts of constitutional courts have significant influence on judicial review and index of  
rigidity of constitution. 
Gallagher index of disproportionality
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, where  i s  is the share of seats for party i and m the number of 
parties. 
The objectives of the research are listed as follows: comparing i) Elections, ii) Post-communist Institutions, iii) 
Women in Parliament, iv) Party System, v) Complexion of Government, vi) Democracy, vii) Industrial Relations 
and viii) Judiciary criteria in Western Balkan countries. The scope of the research in terms of criteria and 
factors are as such: i) Elections (e.g. date of election of national Parliament, voter turnout in the parliamentary 
election, number of seats contested in each election, electoral threshold, percentage of votes, percentage of 
seats, mode of electing the president, president’s term in office, date of election of president, turnout for 
presidential election, percentage of votes obtained by the winning candidate in presidential election), ii) Post-
communist Institutions (e.g. bicameral or unicameral parliament, subordinated upper chamber, mode of 
election of upper chamber, form of state organization as defined by constitution, judicial review, electoral 
system for the Parliament, type of cabinet, index of rigidity of constitution, required referendum, veto point 
referendum, popular veto, popular initiative and political system), iii) Women in Parliament (e.g. percentage  
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of women in Parliament, number of women in Parliament), iv) Party System (e.g. effective number of parties 
in Parliament, index of fractionalization of the party –system), v) Complexion of Government, vi) Democracy 
(e.g. year of acquisition of independence or official end of communist rule, overall status of a country, rating of 
Political Rights, rating of Civil Liberties, Democratization score, Rule of Law score, Economic Liberalization 
score, rating of press freedom scores, Corruption Perception Index, violent conflict inside the country or at the 
borders), vii) Industrial Relations (e.g. number of workers involved in labor conflicts, number of days not 
worked,  unemployment  as  a  percentage  of  the  labor  force)  and  viii)  Judiciary  (e.g.  Constitutional 
Comparisons, Constitutional Court and Judicial Review). In this study, the hypotheses of Post-Communist 
Institutions and Democracy were merely taken into account because of the scope of the research. Thus the 
hypotheses of Elections, Women in Parliament, Party System,  and Complexion of Government, Industrial 
Relations and Judicial framework were excluded. 
 
2. METHODOLOGY AND BACKGROUND 
Why the Western Balkan countries were chosen for a comparison analysis? Geographically, the Western 
Balkans consists of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, and 
Serbia. Croatia was excluded because of achieving a certain date (i.e. mid-2013) for being the twenty-eighth 
member state of the EU. All other Western Balkan states have put the full membership objective as ultimate 
achievement on their national agenda. Thus for the EU the most crucial point is the development process in 
these states and efforts for achieving EU standards. Of course, achieving EU standards is not possible with 
merely national capital and state development plans. The European capital flows and direct investments will 
enhance collaboration with state actors and philanthropic actions with civil society in Western Balkans. 
From  international  migration  point  of  view,  the  Western  Balkan  case  is  sui  generis.  The  European 
Commission has been published many analytical reports and strategy papers for particularly Western Balkan 
countries. Above all, from the European Union perspective, the Western Balkan region has a very high priority 
for pursuing the EU 2020 targets and enhancing the development process both internally in the EU and 
externally in Western Balkans. Agreeably, the distance among the EU and Western Balkans is a factor that 
distinguishes the region from other regions of the world. The EU considers the relationship with the region as 
both strategy and security cycle. Most of migration influxes to the EU come from the countries of this region 
and that’s why the hybrid model proposed is significant and it is supposed to be an effective strategy for the 
EU enlargement, integration, stability, and development processes. 
To support and improve hybrid model, the author has participated in various conferences in European 
Parliament  and  European  Commission  such  as  the  conference  of  Mr.  Andrew  Rasbash,  Head  of  Unit: 
Institutional building, TAIEX, TWINNING, that was entitled ‘The EU’s Enlargement Policy’ and the conference 
of Mr. Jordi Garcia Martinez, the Policy Officer – Visa Policy, which was entitled ‘The EU’s Asylum Policy’. The 
author has also participated in a conference which is entitled ‘Habermas und der Historische Materialismus.’ 
The conference was organized on 23-25/03/2012 and Emeritus Prof. Dr. Karl-Otto Apel (Universität Frankfurt 
am  Main),  Emeritus  Prof.  Dr.  Jürgen  Habermas  (Universität  Frankfurt  am  Main)  and  many  other  social 
scientists  have  participated  as  speakers  and  listeners  at  Bergische  Universität  Wuppertal  in  Germany. 
Altogether, the author has applied two cases i.e. Heidelberg Intercultural Center (Heidelberg Interkulturelles 
Zentrum) and ASAN  - Albanian Students Abroad Network (Rrjeti i Student￫ve Shqiptar￫ n￫ Bot￫) to the 
research. The first case is testing the perception of a migrant receiver country (Germany) and the second case 
is testing the perception of migrant sender country (Albania). The author has carried out an in-depth interview 
with  Mr.  Michael  Mwa  Allimadi  who  is  the  head  of  the  Foreigners’  &  Migrants’  Council  in  Heidelberg 
(Ausländerrats / Migrationsrats). The outcomes of the in-depth interview are very significant in terms of the EU 
integration and development processes and explain how hybrid structures just like the Heidelberg Intercultural 
Center and ASAN as hybrid cases are likely to be spread and networked in the future. 
Eventually,  the  information  was  mostly  collected  from  the  World  Bank  databases  and  the  European 
Commission published reports in order to analyze each state separately and then compare the illustrations for 
finding out similarities and differences among each other.  
 Systematically, the study presents the interrelationship among concepts and categories of comparison 
analyses of Western Balkan countries’ data. The first step of migration process is visa application. Many 
embassies of EU member states in Western Balkan countries have set up new regulations and procedures so 
that migrants or potential migrants in these regions cannot obtain a valid visa (long term visa) because of not 
meeting the eligibility criteria. The evaluation process of visa applications reflects the attitude of EU member 
states  toward  migrants  and  gives  a  clue  regarding  the  degree  of  the  usage  of  rigid  and  restrictive  visa 
regulations and procedures. If migrants succeed to obtain a valid visa, then the second step is about the 
remittances. Even though the migrants declare how they will finance themselves in host countries during visa 
application  process,  many  inconvenient  matters  may  occur  while  they  are  in  host  countries  or  different 
problems may emerge in home countries. Thus inward and outward remittances are the inflexible dynamic 
factors which directly influence both migrants at host countries and their families at home countries or vice 
versa. The transfer of money amounts points out another issue which is obligatory partnership with private 
banks and institutions. Even public institutions at home countries may need to work with private institutions at 
host countries because of several reasons. One of these reasons is the protection of migrants who are living in 
between home and host countries. For instance, migrants who face financial problems actually are quasi-labor 
problems of both sides, i.e. home country and host country. Therefore, interhybridity proposes a solution that 
links home and host country with public and private actors, and migrants with civil society, and provides 
definite solutions for labor related issues. The third step is asylum that covers unqualified and low-skilled 
migrants. Generally, asylum seekers from Western Balkan countries temporarily find solutions for working and 
staying at host countries. The pushing factors at their home countries, the high level of competitiveness, 
restrictive  migration  and  asylum  policies  at  host  countries  are  the  essential  points  which  force  asylum 
applicants finding alternative solutions. However, these solutions sometimes turn out as illegal forms and 
damage the image of home country and make the host country change the positive attitude toward asylum 
seekers. In fact, the main reason of negative behaviors of asylum seekers is the lack of information sources. 
Altruistically, hybrid model will ensure various knowledge base online platforms for asylum seekers so that they 
will enhance the awareness of opportunities and advantages both at home and host countries. The fourth step 
is more related to international migration because migration as a category frames the influxes and dynamics 
from a broader perspective. With this respect, hybrid model will provide strategies, policies and more effective 
solutions for measurement of migration dynamics and creation of collaborations among state, private and civil 
society in terms of pursuing triple win solutions (home, host countries and migrants) via indirect centralization 
within public sphere and state’s authority to attain the ultimate achievement. This will be a reflection of global 
trends because on the one side, in the EU, there is a demand for legal migration of high skilled workers and 
well-educated students and on the other side there is an ideal type which is shaped by migrants of Western 
Balkan countries and symbolizes successes (i.e. achieving unimaginable). Profoundly, this combination will 
strengthen the partnership level among home and host countries and will provide some definite solutions for 
issues  such  as  unemployment,  pensions,  bargaining,  social  dialogue,  social  protection  and  inclusion, 
healthcare, job creations, capacity building and so on. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
7 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A Range of Methodologies and Their Related Paradigms 
Source: Healy and Perry, 2000:121 
 
Positivism, Constructivism and Case Study Research were followed as paradigmatic research methods. The 
research has a mainstream methodology understanding that means the specifications of these three methods 
were partly engaged to the research. Positivism supports a quantitative methodology and generally utilizes a 
hypothesis approach, which is then tested empirically, as the ontological perspective dictates that objective 
enquiry provides a true and predictive knowledge of external reality.  The goal of positivism is scientific 
explanation whereas the purpose of social science is the “understanding of the meaning of social phenomena”. 
Constructivism, broadly conceived, is the thesis that knowledge cannot be a passive reflection of reality, but 
has to be more of an active construction by an agent.  Although this view has its roots in the ideas of Kant, the 
term was first coined by Piaget to denote the process whereby an individual constructs its view of the world. 
Case Study is an empirical inquiry that: investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context 
when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple 
sources of evidence are used.5 
 
3. DATA OVERVIEW: EMPIRICAL COMPARISON OF WESTERN BALKANS 
The  outcomes  of  data  comparison  of  Western  Balkan  countries  are  as  follows:  Serbia  has  the  highest 
international migration stock and percentage of population. Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  follow  Serbia  with  high  level  of  migration  stock.  Noticeably,  percentage  of  population  of 
international migration stock of Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania are relatively high despite the fact that 
these  countries  have  a  low  population  rate  comparing  with  Serbia.  Symptomatically,  the  results  of  the 
comparison of percentage of population of the stock of immigrants, females as percentage of immigrants and 
percentage of population of the stock of immigrants of Western Balkan countries are as such: Montenegro has 
the highest percentage of population of the stock of immigrants and females as percentage of immigrants. 
Exclusively, Albania has the highest percentage of population of the stock of emigrants. Albania has the 
highest number of migrant stock at home country and Bosnia and Herzegovina has the highest number of 
migrant  stock  at  host  country.  Comparing  inward  and  outward  remittance  flows  of  the  Western  Balkan 
countries, the graphs illustrate dynamic trends. For example, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have high 
level of inward and outward remittance flows. Albania has the lowest level of outward remittance flows. 
 The World Bank data comparison of refugee population by country or territory of asylum of Western Balkan 
countries indicates interesting results. Montenegro and Serbia have the highest refugee population, whereas 
Albania has the lowest refugee population by country or territory of asylum. The World Bank data comparison 
of refugee population by country or territory of origin of Western Balkan countries emphasizes the fact that the 
Western Balkan region has a very high level of refugee population by country or territory of origin. Particularly, 
Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania have the highest refugee population level. Whereas Montenegro 
has the lowest refugee population by country or territory of origin. 
With  respect  to  the  illustrations  above,  researchers  may  recognize  many  similarities  among  Western 
Balkan countries when they especially focus on concepts such as inward and outward remittance flows, 
refugee population by country or territory of asylum, bilateral estimates of migrant stock data at home and host 
countries  and  so  forth.  The  crucial  point  for  generating  a  theoretical  model  in  migration  research  is  the 
generalization of concepts as categories. This may provide significant correlations among similarities and 
differences. 
Numerical results of Western Balkans are as such6: During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, 
Albanian net migration (total migration) numbers are as follows: -270245 (2000) -72243 (2005) and -47889 
(2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum has decreased from 523 refugees in 2000 to 76 
refugees  in  2010,  whereas  refugee  population  by  country  of  territory  of  origin  has  increased  from  6802 
refugees in 2000 to 14772 refugees in 2010. There is also an incline at the international migration stock: 76695 
(2000) 2.5 per cent of population, 82668 (2005) 2.6 per cent of population and 89106 (2010) 2.8 per cent of 
population. During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, Macedonian net migration numbers are as 
such: -9000 (2000) -4000 (2005) and 2000 (2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum has 
decreased from 9050 refugees in 2000 to 1398 refugees in 2010, whereas refugee population by country of 
territory of origin has increased from 2176 refugees in 2000 to 7889 refugees in 2010. There is also an incline 
at the international migration stock: 125665 (2000) 6.3 per cent of population and 129701 (2010) 6.3 per cent 
of population. During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, Montenegro net migration numbers are as 
follows: -32450 (2000), -20632 (2005) and -2508 (2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum 
has decreased from 24019 refugees in 2009 to 16364 refugees in 2010, whereas refugee population by 
country of territory of origin has increased from 2582 refugees in 2009 to 3246 refugees in 2010. There is also 
a decline at the international migration stock: 54583 (2005) 8.7 per cent of population and 42509 (2010) 6.7 
per cent of population. During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, Bosnia and Herzegovina net 
migration numbers are as such: 281795 (2000) 61825 (2005) and -10000 (2010). Refugee population by 
country or territory of asylum has decreased from 38152 refugees in 2000 to 7016 refugees in 2010, and 
refugee population by country of territory of origin has decreased from 474981 refugees in 2000 to 63004 
refugees in 2010 as well. There is also a decline at the international migration stock: 96001 (2000) 2.6 per cent 
of population, 35141 (2005) 0.9 per cent of population, and 27780 (2010) 0.7 per cent of population. During 
2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, Serbia net migration numbers are as follows: -147889 (2000) -
338544 (2005) and 0 (2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum has decreased from 484391 
refugees in 2000 to 73608 refugees in 2010, whereas refugee population by country of territory of origin has 
increased  from  146748  refugees  in  2000  to  183289  refugees  in  2010.  There  is  also  a  decline  at  the 
international migration stock: 856763 (2000) 11 per cent of population, 674612 (2005) 9 per cent of population 
and 525388 (2010) 7 per cent of population. Axiomatically, migration flows from Western Balkan to the EU 
have also economic consequences and dimensions. Incrementally, in Albania, there is an increase at both 
inward remittance flows and outward remittance flows. In 2003, the inward remittance flows is $889 million, 
and in 2009 the inward remittance flows reached $1.3 billion. Comparably, in 2003, the outward remittance 
flows is $4 million, and in 2009 the outward remittance flows reached $10 million. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
in 2003, the inward remittance flows is $1749 million, and in 2009 the inward remittance flows reached $2.2 
billion. Respectively, in 2003, the outward remittance flows is $20 million, and in 2009 the outward remittance 
flows reached $61 million. In Macedonia, in 2003, the inward remittance flows is $174 million, and in 2009 the 
inward remittance flows reached $401 million. 
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Rhythmically, in 2003, the outward remittance flows is $16 million, and in 2009 the outward remittance 
flows reached $26 million. In Serbia, in 2003, the inward remittance flows is $2.7 billion, and in 2009 the inward 
remittance flows reached $5.4 billion. However, there is a decline at outward remittance flows from $138 
million  in  2008  to  $91  million  in  2009.  Another  economic  consequence  of  migration  flows  is  workers’ 
remittances: in 2009, Albania received $1.1 billion worth of remittances per year, Bosnia and Herzegovina $1.4 
billion, FYR Macedonia $260 million and Serbia $3.8 billion. 
Empirical results also illustrate another aspect of immigration from Western Balkan to the EU. Feminization 
of migration policies is very crucial because the empirical results highlight the fact that a high percentage of 
immigrants stock in 2010 is females. In Albania, 53.1 per cent, in Bosnia and Herzegovina 50.3 per cent, in 
Macedonia 58.3 per cent, in Montenegro 61.5 per cent and in Serbia 56.7 per cent of immigrants are females.  
Adhering to the data given above, from gender perspective, at national level states must regulate specific 
immigration regulations for protection of female immigrants and ensure fair and anti-discriminative solutions. At 
supranational level, the European Commission should amend immigration regulations with a guarantee of full 
protection of female migrants’ rights. No doubt, feminization of migration is an important factor for demographic 
change in the EU and might be a perfect solution for ageing population of the EU. Feminization of migration 
has also another significant effect on family reunifications and fits in the dialectics of triple win and hybrid 
model. 
 
Table 1. The EU Financial Allocations for Western Balkan Countries 
 
Western Balkan Countries  Multiannual Indicative Financial Framework 
Albania (2011-2013)  €228.82 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (2011-2013)  €328.7 
Kosovo (2011-2013)  €212.4 
Macedonia (2011-2013)  €320.3 
Montenegro (2011-2013)  €104.9 
Serbia (2011-2013)  €622.3 
Total Amount  €1.81 billion 
 
Source: Author’s compilation based on European Commission Dataset 
 
Comparably, the total amount of the EU financial allocations for Western Balkans is a bit higher when the 
allocations are considered at population base (Western Balkans total population: 18.66 million). To be sure, 
this evidence illustrates at which level the EU cogitates Western Balkans.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4. THE GENESIS OF HYBRIDITY NOTION IN SOCIAL SCIENCES 
Sociologists argued hybridity as an indispensable collaboration and voluntary or strategic efforts of state, 
private actors and non-profit organizations. Anheier examined quasi-nongovernmental hybrid forms and the 
relation between the public sphere and the voluntary sector in Germany. He found out that the public sphere is 
institutionally embedded between state and society and located among the decentralized public sector and the 
centralizing tendencies in civic society.8 In this respect, the third sector which essentially has characteristics of 
heterogeneity  and  pluralism  rather  than  homogeneity  and  isomorphism  was  argued  for  engagement  in 
between public and private dichotomy. Accordingly, intermediary zone between the state and the market 
covers  an  ambivalent  political  atmosphere,  a  political  economy  of  interest  mediation  and  organizational 
sociology. Thus, hybridity as appeared in sociological research area, paradoxically, relied on confrontations 
with difficulties that occur among Government Organizations (GOs), Private Nonprofit Organizations (NPOs) 
and Private Market Organizations (PMOs). 
Hybridity lies behind the understanding of third way approach. ‘The Third Way’ was argued by many 
remarkable  scientists,  politicians  and  authors.9  The  third  way  has  various  meanings  such  as  ‘new 
progressivism’ for the American Democrats, ‘new labor’ for the Labor Party in Britain, a mainstream left or 
central  left,  a  left-right  rationalization,  political  environmentalism  for  Al  Gore,  the  modernizing  left  or 
modernizing social democracy as Giddens-Blair concept, the structural pluralism in terms of the theory of 
structuration of Giddens. The distinction among the hybrid model and the third way idea is that the hybrid 
model seeks for approaching governance equilibrium in terms of the interest of state, economy and civil society 
from a broader perspective? Whereas, the third way idea looks more into political doctrines to create better 
political rhetoric for political actors of center left. Thus, the third way approach has disequilibrium between 
theory and practice. It explains how the ideal policies ought to be; however, in practice it is vague that to which 
issues it provides solutions in real terms. On the other hand, Jordan raised his critics of the third way through 
looking to international financial crisis and Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, and he considered the third way as 
failure because of being unsuccessful at regulating morality in economic and social relations. Jordan included 
the big ‘conservative’ society thesis which is a recent debate in UK to his analyses. As a contestation to the 
third way approach, big society idea is nothing more than an attempt to strengthen and encourage the position 
and active participation of churches and religious actors. Big society thesis reflects a decentralization process 
from central government to local governments and then enforces religious institutions at local level. The hybrid 
model  that  this  study  argues  is  something  more  than  this  picture.  Ideally,  hybridity  looks  into  various 
communities, associations, unions and organizations to form an engaged and networked society. Indeed, it 
tries to shape a hybrid society, not a big society. Thus, this study frankly opposes big society thesis. Of course, 
the  role  and  influence  of  churches  at  increasing  tendencies  and  voluntary  actions  of  societies  are 
indispensable however not at adequate level for dealing with social issues. 
Giddens created a triangle which can be accepted in the context of general/real hybrid model, i.e. finance, 
manufacture  and  knowledge.  He  emphasized  the  fact  that  knowledge  has  become  a  driving  force  of 
productivity and expanding financial markets. Thus, he encourages governments to invest on strengthening 
foundations of knowledge base society. 
Habermas involved to hybridity debate however he strongly stressed the partnership with the leadership 
and central authority of state. He stated that the fundamental rights are effective for offering for participation 
with equal opportunity in the process of production and the interplay of a commercial society or a triple function 
of the fundamental rights is legitimized by the fact that in an industrially advanced society private autonomy 
can be maintained and assured only as the derivative of a total political organization.10 Naively, Habermas 
preferred to construct the relations between state and civil society from Marxist point of view and put forward 
argumentations that take into account the world’s multidimensional transformation process. 
With respect to this great transformation, multilateralism, regionalization and multipolarity caused emerging 
of new regional powers in the world. Monopoly powers are by inches oligopolized and this situation has 
balanced global powers because of the rising competitiveness level at both international and transnational 
level, and therefore the hybrids in various countries are proliferating. 
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Moreover, the economic power shift from the western countries to BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa) and East Asia and Pacific countries has prepared a base for the rise of Hybrid Model. The rise of 
middle classes and Small-Medium-size Enterprises (SMEs) in these countries is a good evidence for effective 
hybridization via national private actors in modern nation states.11 Hybridity has various dimensions; such as 
political hybridity (e.g. hybridity in governance model), economic hybridity (e.g. hybridity in political economy), 
cultural hybridity (e.g. hybrid identities), judicial hybridity (e.g. hybridity in legal systems), environmental and 
social hybridity (e.g. ISO 14000 and ISO 26000), biological hybridity (Darwin’s hybridism approach) and so 
forth.12 
In the light of these considerations, supposedly, with creation of hybrid model within state structure at 
national level or within the EU structure at supranational level interhybridity as the main effect of controlling 
migration approach is possible because ideal hybrid types will work for the beneficiaries of both state and non-
state  parts  with  taking  into  account  ‘migration  driving  forces’  such  as  remittances,  labor  policy  (wages, 
employment and so forth), economic and political motives, symmetric and asymmetric networks. The European 
Commission has created at implementing decision which supports a greater role for non-state actors through a 
partnership with societies, helping non-state actors develop their advocacy capacity, the ability to monitor 
reform and their role in implementing and evaluating EU programmes. The Commission has established a 
‘Civil Society Facility’ to provide funding for non-state actors. The objective of the Facility is to strengthen and 
promote the role of non-state actors in reforms and democratic transformations through increased participation 
in the fulfillment of Neighborhood Policy objectives. 
Considering clarifications above, interhybridity is not possible with using only hard law of states toward 
migrants. Conversely, using hard law for managing migration and asylum issues may cause an incline at illegal 
migration flows. It ought to be noted that preventing illegal migration covers alternative patterns that are in 
favor of migrants. The attempts to control the migration flows with hard law instruments may cause an increase 
in the number of illegal migration and cooperation of migrants with illegal networks. Interhybridity is an open 
debate  for  scholars.  Castles  argued  that  a  general  theory  of  migration  is  neither  possible  nor  desirable. 
Hypothetically, researchers can make significant progress by re-embedding migration research in a more 
general understanding of contemporary society, and linking it to broader theories of social change across a 
range of social scientific disciplines.13 
Habermas argued that developing the idea of theory of society conceived with a practical intention. He 
proposed  historical  materialism  which  embraces  the  interrelationships  of  the  theory’s  own  origins  and 
application. He classified three aspects of the relation between theory and praxis: empirical, epistemological, 
and methodological aspects. Excellently, Habermas stated that: ‘Political theory cannot aim at instructing the 
state what it should be like, but rather instead how the state – the moral universal – should be known.’ 
Therefore, a convergence of the two systems on the middle ground of a controlled mass democracy within the 
welfare state is not to be excluded. 
In the light of theory and practice understanding, two examples can help us to measure how hybridity may 
work in EU, Western Balkan countries. The first example is a hybrid project in Heidelberg (Germany). The 
author of this article has carried out an in-depth interview with Mr Michael Mwa Allimadi who is the head of the 
Foreigners’ & Migrants’ Council in Heidelberg (Ausländerrats / Migrationsrats). Heidelberg Intercultural Center 
(Heidelberg Interkulturelles Zentrum) is currently a general/real hybrid project which is a common platform for 
state, private and civil society. It has been established in April (2012) and the main purpose is to include other 
non-state actors to this platform in order to deal with migrants’ integration problems, society needs and many 
other issues which are waiting for immediate solutions. During the interview, Mr. Allimadi perfectly enlightened 
me regarding the passion of the people who work in Citizen Department (Bürgeramt) and volunteers who 
participate in the project from various institutions. The project likelihood has the potential to create a transition 
from general/real hybrid project to specific/ideal hybrid project. Mr. Allimadi shared with me the project’s motto 
that is ‘problems are potentials.’ 
 
 This is a very crucial point because hybridity has state and non-state actors and each actor has its own 
problem. This means with coming together problems of some actors will be transformed as potentials or 
opportunities for other actors. This puts indirect centralization and social transformation in a consensus of 
hybrid  platform  together.  Togetherness,  openness  and  solidarity  are  three  principles  of  this  harmony. 
Idiomatically, Mr. Allimadi stated that ‘if you open your door to others, then you begin to live in a huge house 
(He referred to an African proverb).’ The author of this article is currently preparing a similar hybrid project for 
Western  Balkan  countries’  institutions  for  benchmarking,  embedding  and  proliferating  hybridity.  The  other 
hybrid project is ASAN Albanian Students Abroad Network (Rrjeti i Student￫ve Shqiptar￫ n￫ Bot￫). The aim of 
the ASAN project is to increase engagement and integration of Albanian young generation who live, study 
and/or work abroad. ASAN network will be a hybrid network of young people at home country and host 
country. ASAN project participants have created an online database (www.asan.al) and rapidly increased 
capacity of the network. Just like the Heidelberg Intercultural Center, ASAN project will deal with internal and 
external integration issues as well. Currently, ASAN project has a general/real hybrid model image, however 
increasing patriotism trend of Albanians, the willingness level and incline of participation level will shift this 
image  to  specific/ideal  hybrid  model.  Namely,  objectives  of  the  project  are  listed  as  such:  benefit  from 
intellectual property and energy of young ethnic Albanians; take the future of Albania under control; creation 
and coordination of youth Albanian Lobbies; increase the influence of national Albanian identity; establish a 
national online database system; provide internships and job opportunities for Albanian migrants; increase 
Albanians’ representation in world affairs; unify state and non-state actors in a common platform; balance 
employment demand-supply of state and private sector; and unify Albanian youth with their diversities. 
 
5. THE SOCIO-POLITICAL ANALYSES OF WESTERN BALKAN COUNTRIES 
Hans  Kelsen  (1955)  investigated  Socialist  Law  Legal  System,  Soviet  Political  Structures  and  various 
interpretations and approaches of the Socialist Law of State. These interpretations influenced the Western 
Balkan countries that were a part of Soviet Union.14 However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union the legal 
superstructure and sovereignty of these states were overwhelmingly damaged. In this context, the research 
has examined how Democracy, European Industrial Relations and Post-Communist Institutions in Western 
Balkans have been transformed in frame of EU integration process and enlargement agenda. Undoubtedly, 
industrial  relations  and  employment  relationship  (i.e.  the  relationship  between  employees,  employee 
representatives,  employers  and  nation-states)  are  very  important  factors.  Especially,  the  Western  Balkan 
countries were investigated in order to find out whether the EU integration process and EU Legal Structure 
(e.g. the Lisbon Treaty “TFEU” the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the acquis communautaire) for Western 
Balkans have significant effects on Balkan states’ transition to the European Social Model; such as, social 
dialogue,  tripartite  and  bipartite  information  exchange  and  consultation,  collective  bargaining  and  legal 
provisions regarding employment conditions and social protection. In general, the research is in a tight manner 
bound on the criteria and factors of the Comparative Data Set (SPSS DATA 2006) for 28 Post-Communist 
Countries 1989 – 2006, is a collection of political and institutional data which has been assembled in the 
context of the research project “Forms of Government. A Comparative Data Set for 28 Eastern Countries” 
directed by Klaus Armingeon (University of Berne) and funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation.15 
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Table 2. Constitutional Courts of Western Balkans 
 
Country  Website 
The Constitutional Court of Albania 
(Gjykata Kushtetuese e Shqip￫ris￫)  http://www.gjk.gov.al/ 
The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Ustavni sud Bosne i Hercegovine)  http://www.ccbh.ba/eng/ 
The Constitutional Court of Kosovo 
(Gjykata Kushtetuese e Kosov￫s) 
http://www.gjk-ks.org/?cid=2,1 
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia 
(УСТАВЕН СУД НА РЕПУБЛИКА МАКЕДОНИЈА) 
http://www.constitutionalcourt.mk/domino/WEBS
UD.nsf 
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Montenegro 
(Ustavni sud Crne Gore) 
http://www.ustavnisudcg.co.me/engleska/aktueln
ostie.htm 
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Serbia 
(Уставни суд Републике Србије)  http://www.ustavni.sud.rs/page/home/en-GB 
 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
In essence, the role of the constitutional courts in Western Balkan states  is very crucial because judicial 
independence  of  states  and  judicial  review  process  reflect  the  impact  of  the  Europeanization  and 
harmonization process on legal structures, jurisdictions, democratization, rule of law and legalization in the 
context  of  constitutional  courts’  verdicts.  Constitutional  amendments,  constitutional  reforms  or  even 
constitutional change imply that all of these transformation tools stated above are seen as attempts for seeking 
equilibrium among Soviet Socialism and European Democracy. 
 
6. APPROACHING A MULTIDIMENSIONAL EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK OF INTERHYBRIDITY 
 
Many  mathematical,  economical,  advanced  empirical  studies  have  influenced  significantly  the  insights  of 
migration.16  An  economical  and  sociopolitical  migration  model  is  overlapping  with  the  multidimensional 
empirical framework of interhybridity. In this context, the number of workers involved in labor conflicts has an 
effect on the unemployment as a percentage of the labor force (H15) and the constitution (must) have a 
significant  effect  on  industrial  relations  (H16).  The  normative  effect  explains  also  the  Hirschman’s  voice-
entitlement nexus in terms of workers (skilled/unskilled – employed/unemployed) participation in labor market 
and  legitimacy-effectiveness  nexus  in  terms  of  workers  representatives  (trade  unions/works  councils  – 
wage/bargaining). Thus considering democracy level and post-communist institutions in Western Balkans, 
SPSS data outputs illustrate rigorous results: reliability test of democracy criterion (∂=,922; Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin=,819) Barlett’s Test Approx. Chi-Square value is 315,262 and there are high correlations among Political 
Rights  and  Civil  Liberties  (Pearson  Correlation=,927)  Rule  of  Law  and  Democratization  Score  (Pearson 
Correlation=,913) Political Rights and Democratization Score (Pearson Correlation=,911) Civil Liberties and 
Democratization  Score  (Pearson  Correlation=,848)  Political  Rights  and  Rule  of  Law  Score  (Pearson 
Correlation=,830) (for further interrelations of these results see appendix IV). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The economical and sociopolitical labor-migration model (Basu 2009): 
‘The economy starts with L native individuals, M migrants and a special resource, K = ∑    
   i which is the sum 
of individual holdings of resources. This resource is used for training a part of the native population (L) that is 
willing to join the skilled labor market (L1). The rest of the native population (L2) and M comprise the unskilled 
labor force’ or 
L2' = L2 + M 
The country produces a good Q using both skilled and unskilled labor L1 and L2'. 
The skilled and unskilled workers are q-complements in the sense that the marginal productivity of the skilled 
workers rises with the amount of the unskilled workers. In the skilled workers' market there is full employment 
(L1=E1), but in the unskilled workers' market there is unemployment, i.e., 
 
L1 = E1 
L2' = E2' + U2' 
where L2' is the total number of unskilled workers, and E2'(U2') is the number of employed/unemployed workers 
in the unskilled labor market. 
Q = Q(E1, E2') 
 
Each individual likes to consume goods and each native individual, i, in the economy has  
share of this special input where PK is the given price at which K can be marketed. 
The utility function is given by 
V = V(Q) 
 
‘The unemployment in the unskilled workers' market results from a wage higher than the market clearing wage 
in the unskilled labor market. This above-equilibrium wage is the result of bargaining between the unions and 
the employers. In their effort to maximize income from the labor market, unions propose a nominal wage W2 in 
the unskilled workers' market. In addition to the nominal wage for the unskilled workers, the unions also 
bargain for some additional nonwage benefits, the money value of which equals θ. This is a payment for 
training to acquire more skill. This is bargained because unions are aware that for the majority of the native 
unskilled workers, PKKi is too small to accommodate training cost.’ The employed unskilled native workers 
would now have 
PKKi + θ = ϕi 
 
to finance the training if they want to join the skilled workers' market (unskilled migrant workers don't have 
PKKi). For the employed native unskilled workers the cost of acquiring skill, Cs, (for a given PKKi) is dependent 
on ϕi and thus on θ; then 
 
 
 
 
‘The employed unskilled native workers would decide to join the skilled workers' market if the net discounted 
expected utility stream with a discount rate r(>0) is higher for that market. The discounted expected utility 
stream for an employed native unskilled worker is given by rV2=(W2+ PKKi)/P where P is the price level and rV2 
shows the return on assets in the unskilled native labor market, which is just equal to current utility. The 
discounted expected utility from the skilled labor market is given as rV1={(W1+ PKKi)/P−c(ϕ)} where c(ϕ) is the 
cost per period when C(ϕ) is distributed over the entire working period. A native worker would be indifferent 
between these two markets when V1=V2. So given the distribution of the capital resource, given W1 and the 
choices for W2 and θ, there will be an equilibrium level of ϕ i.e. ϕ~ for which V1=V2.’ The total number of 
participants/employed workers in the skilled workers' market is given by 
 
 
 
 
where  is the proportion of native unskilled workers at a 
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given θ and would give the proportion of the native population willing to be in the skilled  
workers' market. If the union opts for a bigger θ, ϕi goes up and f(ϕ) moves downward or to the right and L2 
becomes smaller. Thus, the total number of workers in the unskilled native labor market given by 
L – E1 = L2 
 
 
goes down and 
L2 – E2 = U2 also goes down 
where E2(U2) is the employed (unemployed) native unskilled worker. The money value of the total amount 
negotiated by the unions for unskilled workers is written as 
 
 
 
‘Employers choose the level of employment, E2, once unions choose W2 and θ. The total amount bargained 
could have been just the nominal wage if the unions did not want to go for the benefits for acquiring more skill. 
For a chosen level of θ, W2 and a settled wage, W1, in the skilled workers' market, E2′ is determined such that 
W2=PQG2(E2′;E1,θ) and W1=PQG1(E2′(E1,W2,θ),E1) where PQ is the given price of the good. This follows from 
the assumption that the country is small enough to have any effect on prices. For the sake of simplicity it is 
also assumed that the immigrants have no effects on demand. Note that Gi,i=1,2 is the marginal product of the 
respective workers. Unions' bargaining usually involves both skilled and unskilled workers. They are concerned 
about  the  ratio  of  skilled  to  unskilled  workers  in  the  economy,  wages  of  both  types  of  workers,  the 
unemployment level in the unskilled labor market and the effects of migration on the labor market in general, 
especially on the unemployment rate. The unions are also aware of the distortion created by bargaining. For 
the purpose of this model, however, it is assumed that unions do not directly bargain for skilled workers' 
wages. It is generally believed that European unemployment is mainly a problem of the unskilled labor. In other 
words, since there is no threat of a huge supply of unemployed skilled workers to push the wage down in the 
skilled  labor  market,  unions'  bargaining  about  wages  is  focused  on  the  unskilled  workers'  market.  This 
argument stands in line with the fact that unions are less able to influence the skilled labor market outcome in 
Europe, although they take skilled labor's interest into consideration while bargaining for the unskilled workers. 
Thus with existing migrants, the labor market in the economy can be described as follows.’ The total population  
 
 
where L is the total supply of native workers, M is the number of migrants in the total population, E1 is the 
number of skilled workers L2′ is the total (native and migrant) number of unskilled workers E2′ is the total (native 
and  migrant)  number  of  employed  unskilled  workers  U2′  is  the  total  number  (native  and  migrant)  of 
unemployed, E2 is the number of employed unskilled native workers, where EM is the number of employed 
unskilled migrants, U2 is the unemployed native workers and UM is the unemployed migrant workers. The 
employment share of each type of unskilled workers is assumed to be determined by their respective sizes in 
the total unskilled labor force;  
i.e.   is the employment share of native unskilled workers and γE2′ is the number of employed 
native unskilled workers. 
M = EM + UM 
With information about how the unskilled workers decide to join a particular labor market, the union will choose 
a particular combination of W2 and θ to maximize the total earned income (wage and nonwage). The effect of 
the choice of W2 and θ can be derived from the first order condition of unions' income maximization behavior.  
 
 
 
 Unions, interested in the maximization of total labor market income for native workers, will maximize 
 
 
 
with respect to W2 and θ subject to the constraints 
 
 
 
where λ  the weight attached to skilled workers' market in union decision making; τ1  tax on skilled workers' 
income; τ2  tax on unskilled workers' income; γ  proportion of native workers in total unskilled workers and also 
this proportion of total employed unskilled workers is native; b  unemployment benefit and α  weight for the 
unemployment of natives in union decision making. 
‘The first term presents the wage bill from the skilled workers' market. The wage bill of the unskilled resident 
workers' market is presented by the second term. And the third term shows that the national union is likely to 
internalize the effects of union's action on the level of unemployment of the native unskilled workers. Note that 
although unions are not bargaining for the skilled workers, they may take skilled workers' economic condition 
into consideration.’  
First order conditions are presented by 
 
 
 
 
‘Thus, to summarize, equations above solve for unknownsW2, θ, ϕ, W2¯, Cs, E1, L1, L2, E2, E2′, V, EM, L2′, U2′, 
U2, UM, Q, γ and YL given L, M, L–, K, PQ, PK, W1, λ, τ1, τ2, b, and α. It is assumed that i) this is a small country 
with  given  prices,  ii)  immigrants  have  no  impact  on  demand,  iii)  skilled  and  unskilled  workers  are  q-
complements (the latter raises the productivity of the skilled workers), iv) unions don't bargain for skilled 
workers'  wage  but  they  take  into  consideration  skilled/unskilled  labor  ratio,  unemployment  and  non-wage 
benefit, v) skilled market has full employment and unskilled market has unemployment because the bargained 
wage is greater than the market equilibrium wage., vi) all skilled workers are natives. Migrants don't bring any 
capital  with  them  to  be  trained  and  vii)  migration  is  caused  by  expected  wage  difference.  The  optimal 
combination of W2 and θ will be the one where the marginal gain from W2 equals the marginal gain from θ. For 
an interior solution, skilled workers will earn more than unskilled workers and unskilled workers will feel better 
being employed than unemployed; b≤(1−τ2)W2≤(1−τ1)W1. The weights, λ, α, taxes, τ1, τ2, and technology will 
decide whether the wage should be chosen on the elastic or the inelastic part (the second order condition is 
verified. After unions fix W2– (=W2+θ), employers decide on the employment level. Thus W2 and θ enter as 
arguments in the E2′ function. Since the productivity of E1 increases with the size of E2′, the size of E1 becomes 
a deciding factor in the demand for unskilled workers. Thus θ affects E2′ both directly and indirectly.’ 
 
 
 
Keeping W2 constant 
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‘The first term is the usual effect of an increase in the cost of hiring workers. This will have a negative 
impact, reducing the demand for unskilled workers. The non-wage benefit θ (skill training cost) actually helps 
workers move to the skilled workers' market. The second term shows the increase in demand for E2′ because 
vacancies will be created when a number of unskilled workers move to the skilled labor market. When the 
number of skilled workers increases, to maintain the productivity of the skilled workers at the previous level 
(i.e., dW1=0) there will be an additional demand for unskilled workers (because E1 and E2′ are q-complements). 
This  positive  effect  is  shown  by  the  third  term.  The  last  two  terms  thus  generate  favorable  effects  for 
employment of unskilled workers. If the elasticity of the marginal product of the unskilled labor curve is not very 
high, as a result of an upward change in θ the employment of unskilled workers will go up i.e., ∂ E2′ / ∂ θ > 0.  
If unions are interested only in the employed unskilled native workers' market (i.e., λ=α=0) and want to raise 
wage, the absolute value of the elasticity of demand for labor will have to be bigger than one to support a 
positive unemployment benefit (i.e., since b has to be positive to be meaningful, it can only be supported by 
e>1). The existence of high unemployment benefit encourages unions to choose a wage on the elastic part of 
labor demand curve and thus wages and unemployment will be higher, higher is the unemployment benefit. 
Any increase in non-wage benefits will on the other hand have a positive effect on the wage bill (because of 
the favorable effects on dE2′), provided the elasticity of demand for unskilled labor is not very high. It is 
important to note that the negative effect on employment from higher wage demand may be offset by the 
positive employment effect from higher non-wage benefits. This stands in contrast to other analyses in the 
literature where any higher wage demand increases unemployment. In those analyses, if unions are concerned 
about unemployment, the negotiated wage will be driven to a relatively inelastic part of the labor demand curve 
compared to the situation when unions are not concerned about unemployment (i.e., α=0). In this analysis 
even when unions are concerned about unemployment they can bargain for an increase in wages and still can 
generate a favorable employment effect for native unskilled workers through their choice of  θ. However, 
practicing restraints on increased money wage demands will be an additional tool to deal with unemployment. 
In the case when unions deal only with wage compensation, i.e., W2, they will be eager to lower wage benefits 
if they are interested in all three parts (skilled workers' market, unskilled workers' market, and unemployment 
pool) of the labor market but the labor demand is elastic and skilled and unskilled workers are complements. 
The model under the same scenario (i.e., labor demand is elastic and skilled and unskilled workers are 
complement and unions pays attention to the skilled wage bill, unskilled wage bill and unemployment) unions 
can afford not to change the wage demand at all or to change the money wage by a small amount and go for a 
higher  non-wage  benefit  to  maximize  the  total  labor  market  income.  However,  to  take  better  care  of 
unemployment pool and/or skilled labor market, unions will prefer to be on the relatively inelastic part of the 
labor demand curve or to reduce the money wage. Migration is caused by the expected wage (actual wage 
times  the  probability  of  employment)  difference.  A  vast  majority  of  the  immigrants  to  western  European 
countries are unskilled workers. Thus they affect the unskilled native workers' market directly. The quantity of 
immigrants is decided by the government control or quota of immigration. In this section we will find out how 
immigration affects the equilibrium solution. Following immigration γ goes down. As a result, the marginal gain 
from both W2 and θ decline. The relative gain or loss will depend on the existing elasticity of labor demand. 
This suggests that in their negotiation, the labor union may choose a different combination of  W2 and θ 
following migration. They may not change the nominal wage at all; instead unions may try for a reasonable 
increase in the training cost benefits. It was shown in the previous section that when more unskilled employed 
workers opt for training, the total number of skilled workers goes up. This has two-fold effects on the unskilled 
labor market: i) it directly creates vacancies in the unskilled labor market; and ii) the newly trained skilled 
workers need unskilled workers to boost up the productivity in the skilled workers' market (indirect effect). Also 
there will be direct negative effects from raising θ. However, the direct and indirect effects together raise the 
employment of unskilled workers by offsetting the negative effect. Consequently, unemployment goes own. By 
totally differentiating the first order conditions we see that dθ / dM will be positive and dW2 / dM may take either 
positive or negative depending on the values of the second derivatives or the rates at which the change in 
employment is affected by changes in θ and W2 However, dW2 / dM<dθ / dM. The effects of a reduced γ 
following immigration will lead to a new combination of W2 and θ where favorable effect of increasing θ offsets 
other unfavorable effects.’ 
 These effects are shown in Propositions 1–4
 where immigrants do not bring capital with them. 
Proposition 1: An increase in immigration increases the size of the skilled labor market. 
Proposition 2: An increase in immigration reduces unemployment of native workers. 
Proposition 3: An increase in immigration increases the skill composition of the labor market for the native 
workers. 
Proposition 4: An increase in immigration increases national income and native workers' share in the national 
income. 
Proposition 1′: An increase in immigration will increase the size of the skilled workers' market. 
Proposition 2′: An increase in immigration will decrease the size of the unskilled workers' market. 
Proposition 3′: An increase in immigration will increase the skill composition of the labor force. 
 
‘Consequently, unions may not want to increase θ.  Does this provision of non-wage benefit give any new 
insights in dealing with the problems of unemployment that is exacerbated by immigration influx? In analyzing 
unions' response to immigration, many Scholars have shown that unions' reaction depends on whether unions 
are  interested  in  only  native  unskilled  workers'  market  (pure  wage  bill  maximization  for  native  unskilled 
workers) or in unskilled workers' market as a whole (including unemployment of unskilled migrant workers) or 
in both skilled and unskilled workers' market. In their analysis for pure wage bill maximization (i.e., only in 
employed unskilled native workers' market), unions will have to be on that part of the demand curve where the 
value of the elasticity of the labor demand curve is greater than one. In other two cases (i.e. when unions pay 
attention to unemployment or to the skilled workers' market), unions might prefer to be on relatively inelastic 
part. Since bargaining over money wages is not the only choice, unions may accomplish their objective on any 
part of the labor demand curve by negotiating only for non-money wage benefits and keeping the money wage 
fixed. Of course, employment will increase more if labor demand is relatively inelastic. Thus, the introduction of 
the non-wage benefit brings in an element of flexibility that may benefit unions, employers and the government. 
The analysis suggests that as a result of migration when the marginal gain from bargaining for money wage 
goes down, unions have the option of switching their effort to change the non-wage benefit. In fact, irrespective 
of (assumptions about)whether unions want to focus on only unskilled labor market or on both skilled and 
unskilled labor market, the negotiation about non-wage benefit will have a positive effect. For the purpose of 
maximizing the total wage bill, it is better if we allow the unions to include all three parts of the labor market 
(skilled labor market, unskilled labor market unskilled unemployed labor pool).’ 
‘In European Union countries, the governments cannot affect the wages or employment levels directly 
because of the institutional factors. Unions and the employers decide on the wages and employment levels 
through bargaining. The governments are engaged in transfer payment through taxation and unemployment 
benefits.  Thus,  the  government  can  only  control  the  factors  that  indirectly  affect  unions'  and  employers' 
decisions. In a situation when migration act as a ‘competitive fringe’ in the sense that as a result of migration, 
unions follows a wage restraints policy, the governments (especially the left-wing governments who don't want 
to use anti-union policy openly) can use migration as a hidden ‘anti-union’ policy. However, in the model where 
unions  can  use  non-wage  benefits,  migration  does  not  need  to  be  used  as  an  anti-union  policy.  The 
government can change the anti-migration or anti-union environment by encouraging bargaining about non-
wage benefits. Noticing that unions' policy has a favorable impact on unemployment, the government might 
come up with some incentives for the employers to settle for a higher θ than what the employers would have 
agreed to otherwise. Employers also might feel encouraged if they don't need to provide for additional wage 
compensation. 
 
 
                                                            
 Please see Basu 2009 for the proofs and the formula.  
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The government can afford to do this because the total government expenditure on transfer payment goes 
down and tax revenue increases as employment increases following a successful bargaining for a higher θ. In 
that case, the bargaining power of the unions is not weakened in the presence of immigration influx.’ 
The government's budget is given by  
 
 
when B = total budget and immigrants can't join the skilled workers' market. Immigration of unskilled workers 
can affect B if immigration  has any effects on or wages. 
 
 
 
where M = total number of migrants. If unions decide not to change wage benefit at all i.e., (dW2 / dM) = 0, as 
long  as  the  effect  of  the  first  and  the  second  terms  exceeds  that  of  the  last  term  in  this  equation,  the 
government will not resort to any antiunion policy. If both wages and non-wage benefits are changed, the first 
three terms need to exceed the last term for the government not to use any anti-union policy. However, if  
 
 
 
 
(on the highly elastic part of the labor demand curve where migration would act as a competitive fringe) the 
government's  migration  policy  may  reflect  an  anti-union  agenda.  Immigration,  unemployment  and  their 
interrelation not only challenge the labor market of European Union, but they also demand attention for a better 
performance of the Union economy as a whole. The common perception is that the immigration makes the 
unemployment situation worse for the native workers. Scholars have argued that the presence of dominant 
labor unions together with immigration makes European unemployment problem worse than that in the US. 
Since migration can only be controlled by the government, it (especially the left-wing government) can use 
immigration as a covert anti-union policy when immigration acts as a competitive fringe. The analysis offers an 
alternative to that covert antiunion policy. It shows that it is possible to empower unions with an effective 
alternative by allowing them to bargain for non-wage benefits together with wage benefits. These non-wage 
benefits are expected to have favorable effects on unemployment, the skill level of the labor force, and the 
national income. Instead of using politically unfavorable tax or welfare program, the government actually can 
use these redistribution tools to encourage both the employers and the unions to use ‘non-wage benefits’ 
effectively in their bargaining strategy. That will help in avoiding an anti-union or anti-immigration environment.  
 
7. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Dealing with international migration in the age of migration requires concrete solutions and alternative patterns. 
Hegel’s  dialectic  method  might  be  applied  to  international  migration  for  achieving  syntheses  and  better 
outcomes. For instance, Hegel concluded that ‘all that is real is rational, and all that is rational is real.’17 As a 
rational, real and ideal pattern, hybrid model may help to control illegal migration with a proactive vision and 
transform mala fide migration to bona fide migration form. Interhybridity and indirect centralization will create 
more efficient and accurate policies and strategies, however for convergence among EU member states, 
hybrid  structures  ought  to  be  created  at  EU  supranational  level  with  vertical  relations.  With  indirect 
centralization within the confine of state’s control mechanism, authority and public sphere, these structures will 
have same legitimacy and effectiveness at the EU supranational level, and thus EU may improve its common 
migration and asylum policies in this way. Furthermore, empirical findings of the research have alarmed for the 
need of moral consciousness in migration turbulence through interhybridity mechanisms and good migration 
governance within the framework of hybrid model. 
 The rise of forced migration and pushing factors prepared a ground for researchers to improve migrant-
based approach with collection of migrants’ narratives. Empirical results are not just simple numbers, thus 
these should be investigated with migrants’ narratives analyses. 
Narratives of migrants in Western Balkan countries are lessons and recommendations for all migrants in 
the world. Openly, hybrid model is a platform in which people share their experiences, and therefore hybridity 
is likely to increase equal opportunity and active participation, enhance engagement of migrants to diaspora 
events and ethnic enclaves, maximize benefits and minimize negative effects, and enhance the humane of 
migration from a holistic perspective. Hybrid model will enhance communicative action among home, transit 
and host countries and develop mechanisms for these countries to facilitate the exchange of information, 
create ground for networking and ensure a communication platform. 
The role of the EU is to help Western Balkan countries to keep up realizing reforms in various areas. The 
Western Balkan counties’ migration flows to the EU can be decreased with the European Union stabilization 
and  integration  reforms,  enlargement  and  neighborhood  policy and  the  Stabilization  Association  Process. 
These reciprocal communication will balance the European Union relations with BRICs and eastern countries 
which  have  multi-dimensional  (economic,  politic,  religious  etc.)  nexus  with  Western  Balkan  countries. 
Obviously, it can be claimed that partnership and solidarity with Western Balkan countries have significant 
influences for attainment of the EU 2020 targets and hence integration and stabilization of Western Balkan 
countries within the EU will be a driving force for the EU. 
With  respect  to  EU  2020  targets,  high  skilled  workers  of  these  countries  are  seen  as  potentials  or 
opportunities, whereas asylum seekers of these countries are seen as threats or potential problems. Therefore, 
the European Commission is working on how to attract high skilled labor migrants in order to balance the need 
of 20 million high skilled workers over next years. Both two hybrid case – i.e. the Heidelberg Intercultural 
Center and ASAN – are strategic models for European Commission to support such projects in order to attract 
high skilled labor migrants and improve employment policies. The convergence of the EU member states’ 
national interests is needed in order to increase the effectiveness of a common EU migration policy. Hopefully, 
non-state actors are ensuring various scientific routes for solving migration issues in different alternatives. The 
involvement of non-state actors to hybrid model will support capacity building and active networking. 
Moralization of migration matters is possible with creating hybrid structures and hybrid forms can provide 
definite solutions in various aspects and interhybridity can transform socially the migration process in favor of 
migrants and society as well as state and non-state actors. Dreaming a world without migrants in the age of 
migration is an utopia (or absolute spirit), however dreaming a world with engaged migrants within societies 
with minimum problems is not only rational but also real. 
To sum up, it is assumed that embedded-hybridity in migration research better can work in post-soviet bloc 
Western Balkan countries. The specific reasons for this are twofold. First, from governance perspective, the 
role of states and the existence of centralized power at the institutional structures of these states still exist. 
Second, people living in the Western Balkans have hybrid identities and are more likely to be included in 
communicative action. Migrants with hybrid identities will protect their culture, national interests and values 
toward inhumanistic post-modern threats instead of serving as actors with dualistic interests in post-colonial 
era. Therefore, hybrid model is an effective strategy for social transformation of interhybridity. 
A list of impact factors and interrelated segments of interhybridity theory is specified as below: 
  Public Sector – Private Sector – Civil Society triangle (hybridity) has a significant effect on indirect 
centralization and enhancement of the state’s authority.  
  Public  Sector  –  Private  Sector  –  Civil  Society  triangle  balances  the  public  and  private  sphere 
dichotomy effectively.  
  Hybridity has a significant influence on political atmosphere, a political economy of interest mediation 
and organizational sociology.  
  Hybridity  has  a  positive  impact  on  the  strategic  operations  of  voluntary  sector  and  non-profit 
organizations. 
  Hybridity affects the heterogeneity and pluralism level of state and non-state actors and provides that 
states are embedded with non-state actors in actor constellations in equal order, and at least of the  
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plurality of opinion development processes and preserves stability of states and ensures incremental 
improvements at institution-based platforms. 
  Hybridity has a significant effect on the consciousness level of foundationalism, cooperationalism, 
institutionalism, social responsibility and philanthropic actions. 
According  to  the  mode  of  institutionalization,  there  are  three  types  of  governance;  ‘governance  by 
governments’, ‘governance with governments’ and ‘governance without governments’.18 
 
Table 3. Governance by/with/without Government(s) 
 
Type of Governance  Mode of 
Institutionalization  Norm Building  Norm 
Implementing 
Governance by 
government(s) 
International/governmenta
l cooperation  Without self-organization  Via nation-states 
Governance with 
government(s)  Global policy networks  With self-organization  With nation-states 
Governance without 
government(s) 
Transnational network 
organizations  Via self-organization  Without nation-
states 
 
Source: Mückenberger 2008: 27 
 
Table 3 illustrates the types of governance with comparing modes of institutionalization and how norms are 
built  and  implemented.  At  the  level  of  governance  by  governments,  states  are  presented  by  their  own 
governments. The governments of states can create international global relations with other sovereign states 
or international organizations. This type of governance doesn’t let non-state actors to build norms and it exists 
only at nation-state level. Classical nation-state model exists and norms are built without self-organization. 
Governance with governments means among others also governments take place; however there are also 
non-state actors. Equal participation of state actors and non-state actors creates hybrid structures in which 
these actors come together to deal with common issues and gain common objectives. Hybrid model is typically 
related to governance with governments because public actors, private actors and civil society actors share 
common interests and these interests are quite important in terms of reciprocal understanding. For state actors 
hybrid model means centralized authority of state that has an influence on private sector and civil society. For 
private actors hybrid model means creation of new markets and capacity building. For civil society hybrid 
model means having a mainstream role among state and private and transform interests in favor of the 
goodness of society. 
The challenge is that non-state actors or sovereignty-free actors influence deeply the inter-state system’s 
monopoly  of  authority.  Some  commentators  assessed  a  power  shift  from  state  to  non-state  actors,  as 
sovereignty-free actors link up and operate across state borders as part of transnational networks. We can 
assume  that  the  current  transformation  of  governance  for  political  concepts  such  as  central  authority, 
sovereignty,  decentralization  and  democratic  legitimacy  is  to  balance  the  tendency  toward  theoretical 
complexity with the need for simplicity to avoid replicating the multidimensional and multicausal nature of 
current world politics. In the light of these considerations, hybrid model in migration research is a transition for 
social  transformation  and  indirect  centralization.  As  an  illustration,  migration  and  asylum  issues  acquire 
elements of multi-level governance and a theoretical dispersal of power away from the nation-state with the 
assigning policy-making capacity to Brussels. On the one hand, this gives to Brussels a central authority, on 
the other hand, this shift of power causes decentralization in nation state structure. Central power of Brussels’ 
governance ought to be effectively enhanced by legally binding verdicts to take illegal migrants and asylum 
seekers under the control of the EU institutions. Collaboration with post-communist institutions in Western 
Balkan states will enhance democracy level, rule of law and the prosperity for civil society. 
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Appendix I. Total Visa statistics 2009 
Schengen States  Schengen visas 
(Airport transit visas, transit visas, short-stay visas) 
Number of national 
long-stay visas 
issued  Number of visas issued  Non issuance rate 
AT  285.196  5,23%  27.169 
BE  165.474  17,38%  24.588 
CH  351.578  8,70%  37.975 
CZ  440.360  3,74%  17.109 
DE  1.491.784  9,06%  139.640 
DK  77.142  5,40%  1.037 
EE  93.464  2,49%  399 
EL  598.883  4,68%  40.686 
ES  748.466  9,97%  135.568 
FI  783.340  1,58%  - 
FR  1.415.886  12,35%  167.108 
HU  272.972  4,14%  8.530 
IS  779  4,18%  88 
IT  1.053.354  5,02%  155.286 
LT  236.299  1,77%  2.824 
LU  5.364  2,38%  27 
LV  118.436  3,48%  1.450 
MT  28.915  9,31%  4.168 
NL  313.534  7,37%  9.032 
NO  105.430  0,75%  16.502 
PL  579.424  3,29%  210.292 
PT  107.224  6,87%  15.800 
SE  172.595  7,62%  527 
SI  97.690  4,19%  391 
SK  62.287  3,78%  1.982 
UE Member States not 
applying yet fully the 
Schengen acquis 
Airport transit visas, transit visas, short-stay visas  Number of national 
long-stay visas 
issued 
Number of visas issued  Non issuance rate 
BG  595.914  1,05%  8.575 
CY  113.205  2,63%  - 
RO  175.956  3,24%  12.831 
Totals 
Airport transit visas, transit visas, short-stay visas  Number of national 
long-stay visas 
issued 
Number of visas issued  Non issuance rate 
Sub-total Schengen  9.605.876  7,11%  1.018.178 
Sub-total non Schengen  885.075  1,70%  21.406 
Total  10.490.951  6,68%  1.039.584 
Source: European Commission 2011: 21 Appendix II. Comparison of the Western Balkan Countries' 2000-2010 Migration Data and 2003-2010 Remittances (millions of US$) According to World Bank Data 
 
Albania                       
Indicator Name  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Emigration  rate  of  tertiary 
educated  (% of  total  tertiary 
educated population) 
17.45868                     
Net migration  -270245         
-72243         
-47889 
Refugee  population  by 
country or territory of asylum 
523  292  17  26  51  56  56  77  65  70  76 
Refugee  population  by 
country or territory of origin 
6802  7626  10761  10385  10478  12722  14079  15340  15006  15711  14772 
International  migrant  stock, 
total 
76695          82668          89106 
International migrant stock (% 
of population) 
2.496699         
2.631231         
2.780839651 
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant 
Stocks in 2010* 
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population censuses of individual 
countries) to the UN  
Home Country: 89106 
Host Country: 1438451 
Stock of emigrants in 2010  Top destination EU countries: Greece, Italy, Germany, the UK and France  1438.3 thousands, 45.4% 
of total population (2.83 
million, Instat 2011) 
Stock of immigrants in 2010  Females as percentage of immigrants: 53.1%  89.1 thousands, 2.8% of 
total population 
Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina 
2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Emigration  rate  of  tertiary 
educated  (% of  total  tertiary 
educated population) 
20.30026                     
Net migration  281795          61825          -10000 
Refugee  population  by 
country or territory of asylum 
38152  32745  28022  22517  22215  10568  10318  7367  7257  7132  7016 
Refugee  population  by 
country or territory of origin 
474981  447321  406326  300006  228815  109930  199946  78273  74366  70018  63004 
International  migrant  stock, 
total 
96001         
35141         
27780 
International migrant stock (% 
of population) 
2.599048          0.92941          0.73880051  
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Bilateral Estimates of Migrant 
Stocks in 2010* 
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population censuses of individual 
countries) to the UN 
Home Country: 27780 
Host Country: 1460639 
Stock of emigrants in 2010  Top destination EU countries: Germany, Austria, Slovenia, Sweden and Italy  1461.0 thousands, 
38.9% of total population 
(3.8 million, 2011) 
Stock of immigrants in 2010  Females as percentage of immigrants: 50.3%  27.8 thousands, 0.7% of 
total population 
Kosovo**  **World Bank migration data are not available for the Republic of Kosovo. However, total number of bilateral migrant stocks for 
host country is; 25251 and top destination countries are; Germany, Italy, Austria and the UK. According to UNDP Kosovo 
Remittance Study 2010 the total amount of remittances received in 2009 was €442.7 million, 11% of the overall GDP in year 
2009. 
Macedonia  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Emigration  rate  of  tertiary 
educated  (% of  total  tertiary 
educated population) 
29.38359                     
Net migration  -9000         
-4000         
2000 
Refugee  population  by 
country or territory of asylum 
9050  4363  2816  193  1004  1274  1240  1235  1672  1542  1398 
Refugee  population  by 
country or territory of origin 
2176  12197  8072  5982  5104  8600  7940  8077  7521  7926  7889 
International  migrant  stock, 
total 
125665          120288          129701 
International migrant stock (% 
of population) 
6.254819          5.901941          6.294444771 
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant 
Stocks in 2010* 
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population censuses of individual 
countries) to the UN 
Home Country: 129701  
Host Country: 447137  
Stock of emigrants in 2010  Top destination EU countries: Italy, Germany, Austria, Slovenia and France  447.1 thousand, 21.9% of 
total population (2 
million, 2010) 
Stock of immigrants in 2010  Females as percentage of immigrants: 58.3%  129.7 thousands, 6.3% of 
total population 
Montenegro  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Emigration  rate  of  tertiary 
educated  (% of  total  tertiary 
educated population) 
                     
Net migration  -32450          -20632          -2508 
Refugee  population  by 
country or territory of asylum              6926  8528  24741  24019  16364 Refugee  population  by 
country or territory of origin              135  557  1283  2582  3246 
International  migrant  stock, 
total           
54583         
42509 
International migrant stock (% 
of population)           
8.709048         
6.731539692 
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant 
Stocks in 2010* 
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population censuses of individual 
countries) to the UN  
Home Country: 42509 
Host Country: 36 
Stock of emigrants in 2010  Top destination EU countries: Denmark and Hungary  0.0 thousands 
Stock of immigrants in 2010  Females as percentage of immigrants: 61.5%  42.5 thousands, 6.8% of 
total population (0.63 
million, 2010) 
Serbia  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Emigration  rate  of  tertiary 
educated  (% of  total  tertiary 
educated population) 
                     
Net migration  -147889         
-338544         
0 
Refugee  population  by 
country or territory of asylum 
484391  400304  354402  291403  276683  148264  98997  97995  96739  86351  73608 
Refugee  population  by 
country or territory of origin 
146748  144231  323335  296632  237032  189989  174027  165643  185935  195626  183289 
International  migrant  stock, 
total 
856763         
674612         
525388 
International migrant stock (% 
of population) 
11.39866         
9.066428         
7.204424665 
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant 
Stocks in 2010* 
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population censuses of individual 
countries) to the UN 
Home Country: 525388  
Host Country: 130844  
Stock of emigrants in 2010  Top destination EU countries: Austria, France and Denmark  196.0 thousands, 2.0% of 
total population (7.3 
million, 2009) 
Stock of immigrants in 2010  Females as percentage of immigrants: 56.7%  525.4 thousands, 5.3% of 
total population 
Comparison of the Western Balkan Countries' 2003-2010 Remittances (millions of US$) 
Albania  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
(estimate) 
Inward remittance flows  598  699  734  889  1161  1290  1359  1468  1495  1317  1285 
Workers' remittances  531  615  643  778  1028  1161  1176  1305  1226  1090   
Compensation of employees  67  84  90  111  132  129  184  163  270  227    
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Migrants' transfer                       
Outward remittance flows        4  5  7  27  10  16  10   
Workers' remittances        0  0    0         
Compensation of employees        4  5  7  27  10  16  9   
Migrants' transfer                       
For comparison: net FDI inflows US$0.9 bn, net ODA received US$0.4 bn, total international reserves US$2.4 bn, exports of goods and services US$3.8 
bn in 2008. 
Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina 
2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
(estimate) 
Inward remittance flows  1595  1521  1526  1749  2072  2043  2157  2700  2735  2167  2228 
Workers' remittances  950  919  956  1143  1474  1467  1589  1947  1899  1432   
Compensation of employees  631  581  540  595  579  570  560  739  828  643   
Migrants' transfer  26  25  30  11  19  5  8  13  8  6   
Outward remittance flows  2  11  14  20  62  40  55  65  70  61   
Workers' remittances    5  7  10  49  28  41  50  53  46   
Compensation of employees  2  6  7  11  13  12  14  15  17  15   
Migrants' transfer                       
For comparison: net FDI inflows US$1.1 bn, net ODA received US$0.5 bn, total international reserves US$3.5 bn, exports of goods and services US$6.8 
bn in 2008. 
Kosovo**  Remittance data are currently not available for Kosovo.   
Macedonia  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
(estimate) 
Inward remittance flows  81  73  106  174  213  227  267  345  407  401  414 
Workers' remittances  80  68  92  146  161  169  198  239  266  260   
Compensation of employees  0  5  14  28  52  57  69  106  140  121   
Migrants' transfer                       
Outward remittance flows  14  21  23  16  16  16  18  25  33  26   Workers' remittances  14  21  23  15  15  14  16  22  28  22   
Compensation of employees      1  1  1  2  2  3  5  4   
Migrants' transfer                       
For comparison: net FDI inflows US$0.6 bn, net ODA received US$0.2 bn, total international reserves US$2.1 bn, exports of goods and services US$5.0 
bn in 2008. 
Montenegro  Remittance data are currently not available for Montenegro.   
Serbia  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
(estimate) 
Inward remittance flows  1132*  1698*  2089*  2661  4129  4650  4703  5377  5538  5406  558 
Workers' remittances                2948  2913  3755   
Compensation of employees                148  191  184   
Migrants' transfer                2  2  3   
Outward remittance flows                114  138  91   
Workers' remittances                95  114  70   
Compensation of employees                17  23  20   
Migrants' transfer                2  1  1   
For comparison: net FDI inflows US$3.0 bn, net ODA received US$1.0 bn, total international reserves US$11.5 bn, exports of goods and services 
US$14.8 bn in 2008. 
*Serbia and Montenegro 
Source: The World Bank 2008; The World Bank 2011 
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Appendix III. Comparison of the European Union Pre-accession Assistance for the Western Balkan Countries 
 
Albania 
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million) 
2011-2013  Period 2007 - 2010  Period 2011 - 2013 
Justice and Home Affairs  56.52  38.66  15% 
Public Administration Reform  43.15  38.66  15% 
Transport  49.06  51.55  20% 
Environment and Climate Change  80.12  51.55  20% 
Social Development  13.40  25.77  10% 
Rural Development/Agriculture  17.20  51.55  20% 
TOTAL  259.45  257.74  100% 
IPA Component  2011  2012  2013 
Transition Assistance and Institution Building  84.30  85.99  87.45 
Cross-border Cooperation  10.13  10.28  10.67 
TOTAL  94.43  96.27  98.12 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million) 
2011-2013  Period 2007 - 2010  Period 2011 - 2013 
Justice and Home Affairs  38.64  55.00  17.5 % 
Public Administration Reform  51.55  40.00  12.7 % 
Private Sector Development  28.10  50.00  15.9 % 
Transport  22.30  35.00  11.1 % 
Environment and Climate Change  72.70  54.22  17.3 % 
Social Development  46.75  40.00  12.7 % 
Acquis related and other Actions  52.54  40.00  12.7 % 
TOTAL  312.58  314.22  100% 
IPA Component  2011  2012  2013 
Transition Assistance and Institution Building  102.68  104.67  106.87 
Cross-border Cooperation  4.75  4.80  4.94 
TOTAL  107.43  109.47  111.81 
Kosovo 
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million) 
2011-2013  Period 2007 - 2010  Period 2011 - 2013 
Justice and Home Affairs  78.50 (18.46%)  61.09  30 % 
Private Sector Development  192.93 (45.38 %)  97.75  48 % 
Public Administration Reform  106.22 (24.98%)  20.35  10 % 
Other  47.55 (11.18%)  24.42  12 % 
TOTAL  425.20  203.61  100% IPA Component  2011  2012  2013 
Transition Assistance and Institution Building  65.83  67.07  70.71 
Cross-border Cooperation  2.87  2.93  2.99 
TOTAL  68.70  70.00  73.70 
Macedonia 
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million) 
2011-2013  Period 2007 - 2010  Period 2011 - 2013 
Public Administration Reform  28.00  21.33  7 % 
Justice,  Home  Affairs  and  Fundamental 
Rights 
44.00  24.38  8 % 
Private Sector Development  45.50  45.71  15% 
Agriculture and Rural Development  46.40  67.04  22 % 
Transport  52.50  60.95  20% 
Environment and Climate Change  28.30  54.85  18% 
Social Development  37.30  30.47  10% 
TOTAL  282.00  304.76  100% 
IPA Component  2011  2012  2013 
Transition Assistance and Institution Building  28.80  28.20  27.94 
Cross-border Cooperation  5.12  5.18  5.24 
Regional Development  39.30  42.30  51.80 
Human Resources Development  8.80  10.38  11.20 
Rural Development  16.00  19.00  21.03 
TOTAL  98.02  105.07  117.21 
Montenegro 
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million) 
2011-2013  Period 2007 - 2010  Period 2011 - 2013 
Justice and Home Affairs  17.85  7.30  8% 
Public Administration  21.65  10.04  11% 
Environment and Climate Change  14.80  22.82  25% 
Transport  16.20  18.26  20% 
Social development  8.63  9.13  10% 
Agriculture and Rural Development  8.10  14.60  16% 
Ad hoc measures  8.11  9.13  10% 
TOTAL  106.54  91.28  100% 
IPA Component  2011  2012  2013 
Transition Assistance and Institution Building  29843599  21585429  49.05% 
Cross-border Cooperation  4310344  9257238  12.94% 
Regional Development  0  23200000  22.13% 
Social Development  0  5757077  5.49% 
Agriculture and Rural Development  0  10900000  10.40%  
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TOTAL  34153943  70699744  100.00% 
Serbia 
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million) 
2011-2013  Period 2007 - 2010  Period 2011 - 2013 
Justice and Home Affairs  42.00  75.00  12% 
Public Administration Reform  89.00  75.00  12% 
Social Development  96.00  75.00  12% 
Private Sector Development  34.00  75.00  12% 
Transport  71.00  75.00  12% 
Environment, Climate Change and Energy  93.00  99.00  16% 
Agriculture and Rural Development  34.00  75.00  12% 
Other EU Acquis and Horizontal Activities  120.00  75.00  12% 
TOTAL  579.00  624.00  100% 
IPA Component  2011  2012  2013 
Transition Assistance and Institution Building  190.00  194.00  203.00 
Cross-border Cooperation  12.00  12.00  12.00 
TOTAL  202.00  206.00  215.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix IV. Output of SPSS Data Analyses (Democracy and Institutions) 
1.  General variables 
Country:    country name 
Countryn:   country code: Albania 1; Bosnia and Herzegovina 2; Kosovo 3; Macedonia (FYR) 4; Montenegro 5; Serbia 6. 
Case Processing Summary 
   N  % 
Cases  Valid  52  86,7 
   Excluded(a)  8  13,3 
   Total  60  100,0 
a  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha  Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardized Items  N of Items 
,922  ,947  4 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.  ,819 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity  Approx. Chi-Square  315,262 
   df  10 
   Sig.  ,000 
Item Statistics  Mean  Std. 
Deviation  N 
rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World"  3,5769  1,07277  52 
Nations in Transit - Democratization score is calculated as the average of scores obtained on 4 dimensions: Electoral 
Process, Civil Society, Independent Media and Governance  3,9660  ,56013  52 
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as the average of ratings obtained on two dimensions: Constitutional, 
Legislative and Judicial Framework and Corruption  4,6996  ,56573  52 
rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World"  3,1923  ,88647  52  
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Summary Item Statistics 
   Mean  Minimum  Maximum  Range  Maximum / 
Minimum  Variance  N of Items 
Item Means  3,859  3,192  4,700  1,507  1,472  ,414  4 
Item Variances  ,643  ,314  1,151  ,837  3,668  ,164  4 
Inter-Item Covariances  ,480  ,246  ,848  ,601  3,440  ,038  4 
Inter-Item Correlations  ,816  ,749  ,896  ,147  1,196  ,004  4 
 
Scale Statistics 
Mean  Variance  Std. Deviation  N of Items 
15,4348  8,327  2,88567  4 
 
ANOVA with Friedman's Test 
   Sum of 
Squares 
df  Mean Square  Friedman's 
Chi-Square 
Sig 
Between People  106,171  51  2,082       
Within People  Between Items  64,590(a)  3  21,530  112,567  ,000 
Residual  24,922  153  ,163       
Total  89,512  156  ,574       
Total  195,683  207  ,945       
Grand Mean = 3,8587 
a  Kendall's coefficient of concordance W = ,330. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Hotelling's T-Squared Test 
Hotelling's T-
Squared  F  df1  df2  Sig 
415,862  133,185  3  49  ,000 
 
Intraclass Correlation Coefficient 
   Intraclass 
Correlation(a)  95% Confidence Interval  F Test with True Value 0 
   Lower Bound  Upper Bound  Value  df1  df2  Sig  Lower Bound 
Single Measures  ,747(b)  ,647  ,831  12,780  51,0  153  ,000 
Average Measures  ,922(c)  ,880  ,951  12,780  51,0  153  ,000 
Two-way mixed effects model where people effects are random and measures effects are fixed. 
a  Type C intraclass correlation coefficients using a consistency definition-the between-measure variance is excluded from the denominator variance. 
b  The estimator is the same, whether the interaction effect is present or not. 
c  This estimate is computed assuming the interaction effect is absent, because it is not estimable otherwise. 
 
Correlations 
    rating of Political 
Rights as 
calculated by 
Freedom House 
and reported 
annually in the 
publication 
"Freedom in the 
World" 
rating of Civil 
Liberties as 
calculated by 
Freedom House 
and reported 
annually in the 
publication 
"Freedom in the 
World" 
Nations in Transit - 
Democratization score 
is calculated as the 
average of scores 
obtained on 4 
dimensions: Electoral 
Process, Civil Society, 
Independent Media 
and Governance 
Nations in Transit - Rule of 
Law score is calculated as 
the average of ratings 
obtained on two 
dimensions: Constitutional, 
Legislative and Judicial 
Framework and Corruption 
rating of Political Rights as calculated 
by Freedom House and reported 
annually in the publication "Freedom 
in the World" 
Pearson 
Correlation  1  ,927(**)  ,911(**)  ,830(**) 
   Sig. (2-tailed)     ,000  ,000  ,000 
   N  112  112  70  70 
rating of Civil Liberties as calculated 
by Freedom House and reported 
annually in the publication "Freedom 
Pearson 
Correlation  ,927(**)  1  ,848(**)  ,788(**)  
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in the World" 
   Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000     ,000  ,000 
   N  112  112  70  70 
Nations in Transit - Democratization 
score is calculated as the average of 
scores obtained on 4 dimensions: 
Electoral Process, Civil Society, 
Independent Media and Governance 
Pearson 
Correlation  ,911(**)  ,848(**)  1  ,913(**) 
   Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000  ,000     ,000 
   N  70  70  78  78 
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score 
is calculated as the average of 
ratings obtained on two dimensions: 
Constitutional, Legislative and 
Judicial Framework and Corruption 
Pearson 
Correlation  ,830(**)  ,788(**)  ,913(**)  1 
   Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000  ,000  ,000    
   N  70  70  78  78 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Each country and territory is awarded from 0 to 4 raw points for each of 10 questions grouped into three subcategories in a political rights checklist (A. Electoral Process, 
B. Political Pluralism and Participation and C. Functioning of Government) and for each of 15 questions grouped into four subcategories in a civil liberties checklist (A. 
Freedom of Expression and Belief, B. Associational and Organizational Rights, C. Rule of Law and D. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights). A country or territory is 
assigned a numerical rating on a scale of 1 to 7 based on the total number of raw points awarded to the political rights and civil liberties checklist questions. For both 
checklists, 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free; each 1 to 7 rating corresponds to a range of total raw scores. Each pair of political rights and civil liberties 
ratings is averaged to determine an overall status of “Free,” “Partly Free,” or “Not Free.” Those whose ratings average 1-2.5 are considered Free, 3-5.5 Partly Free, and 
5.5-7 Not Free. The dividing line between Partly Free and Not Free falls at 5.5. For example, countries that receive a rating of 6 for political rights and 5 for civil liberties, 
or a 5 for political rights and a 6 for civil liberties, could be either Partly Free or Not Free. The total number of raw points is the definitive factor that determines the final 
status. Countries and territories with combined raw scores of 0-33 points are Not Free, 34-67 points are Partly Free, and 68-100 are Free. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Item Statistics 
 
   Mean  Std. Deviation  N 
bicameral or unicameral 
parliament, as defined in the 
country's constitution. 
,69  1,423  484 
form of state organization as 
defined by constitution  -,36  ,823  484 
electoral system for the (lower 
chamber of the) Parliament 
1,00  1,859  484 
index of rigidity of constitution  1,86  2,016  484 
 
ANOVA 
   Sum of 
Squares  df  Mean Square  F  Sig 
Between People  3772,988  483  7,812       
Within People 
Between Items  1222,228  3  407,409  506,961  ,000 
Residual  1164,460  1449  ,804       
Total  2386,687  1452  1,644       
Total  6159,675  1935  3,183       
Grand Mean = ,80 
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Correlations 
     
bicameral or 
unicameral 
parliament, as 
defined in the 
country's 
constitution. 
form of state 
organization as 
defined by 
constitution 
electoral system 
for the (lower 
chamber of the) 
Parliament 
index of rigidity of 
constitution  
bicameral or unicameral 
parliament, as defined in the 
country's constitution. 
Pearson Correlation  1  ,925(**)  ,657(**)  ,844(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed)     ,000  ,000  ,000 
N  486  486  484  486 
form of state organization as 
defined by constitution 
Pearson Correlation  ,925(**)  1  ,703(**)  ,891(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000     ,000  ,000 
N  486  502  484  486 
electoral system for the (lower 
chamber of the) Parliament  
Pearson Correlation  ,657(**)  ,703(**)  1  ,724(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000  ,000     ,000 
N  484  484  484  484 
index of rigidity of constitution 
Pearson Correlation  ,844(**)  ,891(**)  ,724(**)  1 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000  ,000  ,000    
N  486  486  484  486 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
   rating of 
Political Rights 
as calculated by 
Freedom House 
and reported 
annually in the 
publication 
"Freedom in the 
World" 
Nations in Transit - 
Democratization 
score is calculated 
as the average of 
scores obtained on 
4 dimensions: 
Electoral Process, 
Civil Society, 
Independent Media 
and Governance 
Nations in Transit - Rule 
of Law score is 
calculated as the 
average of ratings 
obtained on two 
dimensions: 
Constitutional, 
Legislative and Judicial 
Framework and 
Corruption 
rating of Civil 
Liberties as 
calculated by 
Freedom House 
and reported 
annually in the 
publication 
"Freedom in the 
World"  
rating of Political Rights as calculated by 
Freedom House and reported annually in the 
publication "Freedom in the World" 
1,000  ,896  ,770  ,891 
Nations in Transit - Democratization score is 
calculated as the average of scores obtained 
on 4 dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil 
Society, Independent Media and Governance 
,896  1,000  ,778  ,811 
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is 
calculated as the average of ratings obtained 
on two dimensions: Constitutional, Legislative 
and Judicial Framework and Corruption 
,770  ,778  1,000  ,749 
rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by 
Freedom House and reported annually in the 
publication "Freedom in the World" 
,891  ,811  ,749  1,000 
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Inter-Item Covariance Matrix 
   rating of 
Political Rights 
as calculated by 
Freedom House 
and reported 
annually in the 
publication 
"Freedom in the 
World" 
Nations in Transit - 
Democratization 
score is calculated 
as the average of 
scores obtained on 
4 dimensions: 
Electoral Process, 
Civil Society, 
Independent Media 
and Governance 
Nations in Transit - Rule 
of Law score is 
calculated as the 
average of ratings 
obtained on two 
dimensions: 
Constitutional, 
Legislative and Judicial 
Framework and 
Corruption 
rating of Civil 
Liberties as 
calculated by 
Freedom House 
and reported 
annually in the 
publication 
"Freedom in the 
World" 
rating  of  Political  Rights  as  calculated  by 
Freedom House and reported annually in the 
publication "Freedom in the World" 
1,151  ,538  ,467  ,848 
Nations in Transit - Democratization score is 
calculated as the average of scores obtained 
on  4  dimensions:  Electoral  Process,  Civil 
Society, Independent Media and Governance 
,538  ,314  ,246  ,403 
Nations  in  Transit  -  Rule  of  Law  score  is 
calculated as the average of ratings obtained 
on two dimensions: Constitutional, Legislative 
and Judicial Framework and Corruption 
,467  ,246  ,320  ,376 
rating  of  Civil  Liberties  as  calculated  by 
Freedom House and reported annually in the 
publication "Freedom in the World" 
,848  ,403  ,376  ,786 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Communalities 
   Initial  Extraction 
rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World"  1,000  ,925 
rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World"  1,000  ,871 
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as the average of ratings obtained on two dimensions: Constitutional, 
Legislative and Judicial Framework and Corruption  1,000  ,870 
Nations in Transit - Democratization score is calculated as the average of scores obtained on 4 dimensions: Electoral 
Process, Civil Society, Independent Media and Governance  1,000  ,942 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues  Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total  % of Variance  Cumulative %  Total  % of Variance  Cumulative % 
1  3,609  90,215  90,215  3,609  90,215  90,215 
2  ,251  6,279  96,494          
3  ,093  2,313  98,807          
4  ,048  1,193  100,000          
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
Component Matrix(a) 
   Component 
   1 
rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World"  ,962 
rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World"  ,933 
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as the average of ratings obtained on two dimensions: Constitutional, Legislative and 
Judicial Framework and Corruption 
,933 
Nations in Transit - Democratization score is calculated as the average of scores obtained on 4 dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil 
Society, Independent Media and Governance 
,971 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  1 components extracted. 
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Reproduced Correlations 
     
rating of Political 
Rights as 
calculated by 
Freedom House 
and reported 
annually in the 
publication 
"Freedom in the 
World" 
rating of Civil 
Liberties as 
calculated by 
Freedom House 
and reported 
annually in the 
publication 
"Freedom in the 
World" 
Nations in Transit - 
Rule of Law score is 
calculated as the 
average of ratings 
obtained on two 
dimensions: 
Constitutional, 
Legislative and 
Judicial Framework 
and Corruption 
Nations in Transit - 
Democratization 
score is calculated 
as the average of 
scores obtained on 4 
dimensions: 
Electoral Process, 
Civil Society, 
Independent Media 
and Governance 
Reproduced 
Correlation 
rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom House and 
reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World"  ,925(b)  ,898  ,897  ,934 
  
rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom House and 
reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World"  ,898  ,871(b)  ,871  ,906 
  
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as the average 
of ratings obtained on two dimensions: Constitutional, Legislative 
and Judicial Framework and Corruption 
,897  ,871  ,870(b)  ,905 
  
Nations in Transit - Democratization score is calculated as the 
average of scores obtained on 4 dimensions: Electoral Process, 
Civil Society, Independent Media and Governance 
,934  ,906  ,905  ,942(b) 
Residual(a) 
rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom House and 
reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World"     ,013  -,067  -,023 
  
rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom House and 
reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World"  ,013     -,083  -,058 
  
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as the average 
of ratings obtained on two dimensions: Constitutional, Legislative 
and Judicial Framework and Corruption 
-,067  -,083     ,021 
  
Nations in Transit - Democratization score is calculated as the 
average of scores obtained on 4 dimensions: Electoral Process, 
Civil Society, Independent Media and Governance 
-,023  -,058  ,021    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  Residuals are computed between observed and reproduced correlations. There are 3 (50,0%) nonredundant residuals with absolute values greater than 0.05. 
b  Reproduced communalities 
Rotated Component Matrix(a) 
a  Only one component was extracted. The solution cannot be rotated. 
 
 
 1.  Institutions 
 
bicam   bicameral or unicameral parliament, as defined in the country’s constitution.  
codes: 1 - unicameral parliament; 2 - bicameral parliament; -2 – communist constitution 
subordup  subordinated upper chamber: relationship between the lower and upper chamber, as framed by the post-communist constitutions.  
codes: 1 – upper chamber is subordinated; 0 - upper chamber is not subordinated; -1 – unicameral parliament; -2 – communist constitution or undemocratic rule 
electup    mode of election of upper chamber 
1  codes: 1 – appointment/delegation; 2 – indirect by regional/state legislature; 3 – directly by the people; 4 – other; -1 – unicameral Parliament; -2 – communist constitution or undemocratic rule 
2  federal    form of state organization as defined by constitution 
  codes: 1 – federal state; 0 – other; -2 – communist constitution or undemocratic rule 
judrev  judicial review – existence of an independent body which decides whether laws are in conformity with the constitution 
3  codes: 1 – yes ; 0 – no; -2 – communist constitution or undemocratic rule 
electsys  electoral system for the (lower chamber of the) Parliament 
4  codes: 0 – proportional representation; 1 – proportional representation modified; 2 – majoritarian; 3 – parallel (the chamber is elected using both majoritarian and proportional representation systems, and each is 
allocated a   fixed number of seats); -2 – communist election rule 
cab_type  type of cabinet  
  codes: 1 - single party majority; 2 - minimal winning; 3 - surplus coalition; 4 - single party minority; 5 - minority coalition; 6 -caretaker; 7 - grand coalition 
n/p – non-party ministers or experts; na – presidential cabinets (cabinets at the formation of which the Parliament composition is not taken into account) 
Irid  index of rigidity of constitution 
  codes: 1- ordinary majorities; 2 – more than ordinary but less than two-thirds majorities plus referendum; 3 - two-thirds majorities and equivalent; 4 - supermajorities (greater than two-thirds). If particularly difficult 
conditions for amending the constitution existed, an intermediary category was created by adding .5 to the code describing the basic conditions. 
Req_rev  required referendum 
   codes: 1- yes; 0 – no; -2 – communist constitution or other 
Vp_ref  veto point referendum 
codes: 1- yes; 0 – no; -2 – communist constitution or other 
Pop_veto  popular veto 
  codes: 1- yes; 0 – no; -2 – communist constitution or other 
Pop_init  popular initiative 
  codes: 1- yes; 0 – no; -2 – communist constitution or other  
Topics of referenda:  
refers to the issues on which referenda are required or can be organized 
based on post-communist constitutions 
Topic 1  border issues and association/secession issues; delegation of state powers to international organizations 
codes: 1- yes; 0 – no;  -2 – communist constitution 
 
 
Topic2  adoption of and amendments to constitution; adoption of and change in other laws 
codes: 1- yes; 0 – no;  -2 – communist constitution 
Topic3  dissolution of Parliament; impeachment 
  codes: 1- yes; 0 – no;  -2 – communist constitution 
Topic4  other issues "of national importance" 
  codes: 1- yes; 0 – no;  -2 – communist constitution 
polsys  political system 
  codes: 0 – parliamentary; 1 – presidential; 2 – semi-presidential, dominated by president; 3 – semi-presidential, dominated by parliament; 4 – other 
ppi   presidential power index 
  -2 - communist constitutions 
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2.  Democracy 
 
independ  year of acquisition of independence (for NIS) or official end of communist rule (for CEE) 
  codes: 0 – communist rule; 1 - independent or non-communist 
FH  overall status of a country 
  codes: 0 – not free; 1 - partly free; 2 – free;  
“.” missing value – data does not exist 
FH_PR  rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication “Freedom in the World”  
FH_CL  rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication “Freedom in the World”  
NiT_DEM  Nations in Transit - Democratization score is calculated as the average of scores obtained on 4 dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil Society, Independent Media and Governance (1 highest, 7 lowest) 
NiT_ROL  Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as the average of ratings obtained on two dimensions: Constitutional, Legislative and Judicial Framework and Corruption (1 highest, 7 lowest) 
NiT_EC  Nations in Transit - Economic Liberalization score is calculated as the average of ratings obtained on three dimensions: Privatization, Macroeconomic Policy and Microeconomic Policy (1 highest, 7 lowest) 
NiT_DEM2  Nations in Transit - Democracy score is calculated as the average of scores obtained on 7 dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil Society, Independent Media, National Democratic Governance, Local Democratic 
Governance, Judicial Framework and Independence and Corruption (1 highest, 7 lowest) 
NiT_EP  Nations in Transit – Electoral process score (1 highest, 7 lowest) 
NiT_CS  Nations in Transit – Civil society score (1 highest, 7 lowest) 
NiT_Media  Nations in Transit – Independent media score (1 highest, 7 lowest) 
NiT_GOV  Nations in Transit – Governance score (1 highest, 7 lowest) 
NiT_NGov  Nations in Transit – National democratic governance score (1 highest, 7 lowest); was introduced in 2005 edition (inputed as of 2004) 
NiT_LGov  Nations in Transit – Local democratic governance score (1 highest, 7 lowest); was introduced in 2005 edition (inputed as of 2004) 
NiT_JUD  Nations in Transit – Judicial Framework and Independence score (1 highest, 7 lowest) 
NiT_COR  Nations in Transit – Corruption score (1 highest, 7 lowest) 
freedom1  rating of press freedom  
codes: 0 - not free; 1 - partly free; 2 - free; 
      “.” missing value – data does not exist 
freedom2  rating of press freedom scores. Data is available only from 1994 onward. 
“.” indicates a missing value – data does not exist 
CPI  Corruption Perception Index. CPI score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). 
codes: table entries are CPI values.  
“.” indicates a missing value – data does not exist 
source: Transparency International. 
war  violent conflict inside the country or at the borders. 
    codes: 0 – no violent conflict; 1 – war, civil war or turmoil; 2 – ceasefire 
      “.” indicates a missing value – data does not exist 
 
 